The following essay elaborates on the impact of the border opening of the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region in the aftermath of the independence of the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia. It was written as an assignment during for a presessional language course at the London School of Economics. Therefore the essay follows the guidelines of argumentative essays at British Institutes of higher education. It might be an useful example for international students.
Integration and Disintegration in Xinjiang, China
The debate about the Xinjiang Autonomous Region is overshadowed by the discussion whether or not the Region is itself a legitimate part of the Peoples Republic of China. Social Scientists working on the subject are often inclined to either support the Uyghur claims or to at least de-facto acknowledge the Chinese power in the region.
Apart from this political positioning the real state of the region has to be taken into account. This essay will focus on the main forces leading to either integration or disintegration. On the one hand, the growing interdependence following the cross-border exchange leads to a disintegration of the region (Roberts 2004: 216; Gladney 2004: 118). On the other hand it is argued, that the Chinese policy of stronger integration despite opening up proved to be dominant (Clarke 2008: 96).
In this essay it will be argued that despite disintegrating moments since the early 1990s, overall the integrating momentum prevails. First the disintegrating processes will be displayed, and then three integrating moments will be highlighted. In the following discussion the main arguments are balanced against each other, followed by a conclusion.
Disintegrating moments since 1990
Due to its geographic location Xinjiang was always inclined to an orientation towards the western region of Central Asia. Yet the Chinese leadership was well aware of the danger that lay in strengthening separatist movements due to advocating trade and economic integration (Gladney 2004: 118). Undermining the Chinese authorities would loosen the grip of the central government (Roberts 2004: 235).
The key actors of those disintegrating processes during the 1990s have been traders active in the cross-border trade (Roberts 2004: 225). Thus the opening up of Xinjiang strengthened external influences from neighbouring countries i.e. most dominantly from the Central Asian republics (Clarke 2005: 82). For example two separatist groups based in Kazakhstan have admitted being accountable for most of the bombing attacks in the region (Haider 2005: 528).
Even though there are separatist movements operating in Xinjiang, one has to take into account that the presence of a terrorist threat is at the same time being exploited by the PRC. In fact, violent threats such as bombings have declined since 1997. Furthermore the PRC itself behaves ambivalently with the threat. When attempting to attract investors to the region, a real threat is downplayed. Besides the Uyghur themselves seem not to be attracted to radical Islamist views (Chaudhuri 2005: 124; Haider 2005: 538-39, 531).Integrating processes since 1990s
Conversely to the disintegrating processes, integrating processes are recorded as well. For instance the settling of Han Chinese since 1949 helped integrate the province further into China proper. In fact it led to the establishment of an effective central authority for the first time (Attané & Courbage 2000: 275-76; Wiemer 2004: 169). Gladney argues further that ultimately during the 199os the control by the central government steadily grew (Gladney 2004: 101). What follows is an account of three integrating processes since the 1990s that are traceable to the opening of Xinjiang.
The first process is the cooperation with the Central Asian Republics since their independence in 1992. The strategic consideration behind the adaption of constructive relations can be traced back to the political attempt of the central government to further integrate Xinjiang into the PRC (Clarke 2005: 87). In fact the compromises that the PRC was poised to accept considering border disputes were directly linked to the domestic situation in Xinjiang (Fravel 2005: 79). The strategy of canvassing the Central Asian republics was successful. The eager efforts of the latler in cooperation with their eastern neighbour are an example (Becquelin 2000: 70-71). This rational approach was ultimately crowned by the establishment of the ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ (Clarke 2005: 84) , which has by now established itself as the ‘main regional body linking China and its Central Asian neighbours’ (Dillon 2004: 148).
The second process leading to more integration has been the western development project. Through a series of campaigns following 1992 social stability should be reached through the means of economic development (Milward 2007: 298). The opening up of Xinjiang fit well in the development plan for Chinas west (Wacker 2007: 315) and in 2001 the ‘Develop the West’ Project was established to further deepen this course (Wiemer 2004: 173).
The campaign is the last of a series of attempts to develop Xinjiang and integrate the region into the Chinese market. Thus the control of the central government was strengthened (Heilmann 2004: 175; Gladney 2004: 101; Dillon 2004: 47). As a result, the central state’s control has grown to an extent where Becquelin (2000: 71-72) speaks of re-centralisation of the economy. In fact 59 percent of investments into capital assets are held by the state compared to the national average of 30 percent (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2006; China Statistical Yearbook 2007). As a result the opening led to a stronger integration into the national economy because of the growing economic involvement of the central government (Christofferson 1993: 131, 147ff).
The third aspect is the fruitful adoption of the Xinjiang Production and Development Corps. The corps serves as what Becquelin coins a ‘party-government-army’ (Becquelin 2000: 78ff) and is active in different sectors (Wiemer 2004: 169). The significance of the presence of the XPCC is its character as a state organisation, acting independently from the regional government. Instead its military and political assignments are controlled and led by the State Council (Wiemer 2004: 169: Raballand & Andrésy 2007: 344). One can assume that the establishment of a paramilitary body controlled by the central government consolidated the power of the lalter in economic and political terms. Therefore the XPCC subordinated under the interest of the central government, weighs in as an additional measure of integration into the Chinese state.Discussion
The situation of Xinjiang since the opening is two-fold. Political and economic relations with the Central Asian Republics might be the foundation of integration of Xinjiang into the central polity as anticipated by the central government. At the same time the opening itself tends to be a potential risk for the same development (Clarke 2005: 84).
Thus the question of whether there is integration or disintegration seems contradictory: While the opening up of the borders is of fundamental importance for the economic development and social stability of the region, it is at the same time at least benefitting the Uyghur nationalism aiming to confront the central authority and even taking on separatist notions (Roberts 2004: 235). It seems as if the central governments strategy is targeted at reaching integration by means of economic development. As a result the integrating forces were strengthened to a much higher degree than the disintegrating processes through external factors (Ibid. 236). This strategy is reflected in the notion of a ‘Double Opening’ meaning the effort to integrate Xinjiang with China on the political level and trying to develop the links with the Central Asian republics at the same time (Christofferson 1993).
The decline of terrorist activities since 1997 shows that there has been no serious threat from organized groups for the integrity of the PRC. The ubiquitous repression against real or alleged threats and the success of this policy during the named period shows furthermore that the Chinese state is both capable and willing to shield its interest with violent means if necessary (Chaudhuri 2005: 124-25, 133). Even though there is a threat for the social fabric of China because of unsolved issues with national minorities the latter are seldom regarded as a serious threat for the integrity of the Chinese state in general (Heberer 2000; Heilmann 2004).
The effects stemming from the independence of the Central Asian Republics on Xinjiang were successfully neutralised by the Chinese politics. In part because the interest of the former did not lie in political advocacy for Turkic minorities but in their own integrity as well as economic development (Wang 1997: 11). The priority that the establishment of constructive relationships with its western neighbours, obtained by the Chinese, led to the build-up of cooperative bilateral and multilateral relations over the course of the 1990s. Ultimately this policy was crowned with the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Clarke 2008: 93-94).
Even though the economic development led to an increase in articulation of interest from the region itself and strengthened its position vis-à-vis the central authority (Wacker 1995: 5-6) this process did not led to further disintegration. In contrast this process takes place within the political boundaries of the Chinese state. Hence a disintegrating effect is not to be expected.
With regard to political extremism Zhao argues that the basis of separatism is motivated by ideological means so a betterment of the economic situation will indeed help the overall situation but not clear the ideological basis of separatism (Zhao 2007: 144). Additionally, resistance to the receipt by economical means by national minorities will probably limit the ability of politics in the region (Heilmann 2004: 175). But even though the policy of reform and opening led to a growth of external influence on the national minorities the position of the central government was not distinctly weakened by this. In contrast, the formal arrangement of the PRC has been strengthened by the economic growth (Roberts 2004: 235).
Not least did the infrastructure projects following the ‘Develop the West’ campaign and an overall increase of construction works lead to an increase in Han in-migration to Xinjiang (Roberts 2004: 221-22, 136). Whereas individual and voluntary migration replaced the centrally planned forced migration of the Mao era (Hahn 2004: 995) the migration of Han Chinese remains a mechanism of strengthening the integration of the region with the rest of the Han dominated country (Clarke 2000: 82-83). Additionally one has to take into account the strong stance of the XPCC as a ‘Han-Organization in a Non-Han Region’ (McMillen 1981), that implements economic as well as military politics of the central government.
The political, economic and social control of the PRC over Xinjiang was overall strengthened by the discussed mechanisms. Thus during the 1990s one can state an even closer integration of Xinjiang into China proper (Becquelin 2000: 67; Clarke 2008: 110).Conclusion
This essay has provided an account of the processes following the border opening of 1992. Even though growing dependencies with the Central Asian Republics have been apparent since the beginning of the opening process, Xinjiang stayed integrated into the Chinese polity. The strong position of the Chinese central government has been proven to be dominant vis-à-vis the disintegrating processes enabled by the border opening.
Three main processes where identified to back up the claim. First the cooperative relations with the Central Asian republics that outweighed separatist threats. Second the economic integration triggering a further influx of Han migration and third the strengthening of centrally controlled institutions such as the XPCC. These trends were endorsed in the following years and further consolidated by the ‘Develop the West’ campaign and the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
The independence of the Central Asian Republics has proven to be a challenge for the PRC. But subsequently it has also been proven to provide the opportunity to strengthen the political and economic influence of the central government in Xinjiang. Therefore the opening up of the borders did not lead to disintegration. To the contrary, the Chinese central government did succeed in integrating the region and strengthening its position to an extent like never before in the history of Xinjiang.Bibliography
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